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A traditional—but increasingly unconvincing—critique of markets chal-
lenges their superiority in terms of generating welfare. After all, markets 
can be alienating, they can generate inequality, and, arguably, allow for 
the exchange of goods that ought not to be traded. If these effects collec-
tively made people who live in market societies worse off than those who 
do not, the implementation of markets would be unacceptable. However, 
while markets do have some of these negative effects, the welfare and 
material benefits they provide are massive. In 
Virgil Storr and Ginny Choi provide substantial evidence for the 
conclusion that not only are “people who live in market societies […] 
wealthier, healthier, happier, and better connected than people who live 
in nonmarket societies” but these benefits are available to the rich and 
poor alike: “The least advantaged in market societies are better off than 
the least advantaged in nonmarket societies and may be better off than 
the most well-off in some nonmarket societies” (13). 
However, responding to this traditional critique is  Storr and Choi’s 
primary aim. Instead, they focus on a more nuanced critique. This critique 
accepts that markets produce the aforementioned material benefits, but 
counters that the  problem with markets is that they come at the cost 
of our  integrity. Call this the  (VC). The VC 
claims that  
 
VC1 “Vice is more prevalent in market societies than in nonmarket soci-
eties and virtue is less prevalent in market societies than in non-
market societies.”  
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VC2 “As a society becomes more market-oriented and as the scope of 
the market in a society expands, more vice and less virtue will exist 
in that society.”  
 
VC3 “The more a person engages in market activity, the less virtuous 
they are likely to be.” (44) 
 
Storr and Choi note that both classical and contemporary defenses of 
markets respond to the  critique, but “none of these defenses 
[…] respond to the [VC] […] argument that engaging in market activity can 
corrupt our morals” (65). Some classical responses, like those offered by 
Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith, grant VC3 that markets may allow 
private vice, but they argue that this private vice leads to public virtue 
and so they reject VC1 and VC2. Other market defenders, such as Philip 
Wicksteed and Milton Friedman, argue that markets are morally neutral 
and “are essentially tools that individuals use to further their ends, re-
gardless of their ends” (62). Finally, some defenders argue that markets 
are moral spaces to a certain degree, but at the same time they accept 
that markets can also corrupt. This group, which includes Henry Hazlitt, 
claims that markets are  better than the available alternatives. 
Storr and Choi think these responses are inadequate and concede too 
much to the VC. They argue: 
 
the claim that markets are morally corrupting is simply wrong. 
Markets do not work in theory or in practice the way the moral 
critics and some of the moral defenders of markets contend. (77)  
 
Furthermore, contra VC3, “the more a person engages in market activity, 
the more virtuous they are likely to be” and, contra VC1 and VC2, “as a 
society becomes more market-oriented […] more virtue and less vice will 
exist in that society” (77). 
 
A widely accepted claim about virtue ethics is that virtues are disposi-
tions. According to contemporary analyses of dispositions, they are best 
understood in counterfactual terms (Quine 1960). One way to cash out 
this claim about dispositions is to say that  is disposed to ϕ under con-
ditions  if and only if  would ϕ in some  proportion of possible 
worlds where these conditions obtain (Manley and Wasserman 2008; Fara 
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2005). And since virtues are dispositions, by substitution we can say that 
 has virtue  just in case  would ϕ in some suitable proportion of pos-
sible worlds where certain conditions obtain. More succinctly, we can say 
 has virtue  just in case ’s ϕ-ing is .1 This claim is a claim about 
the  of virtues. 
A second widely accepted claim about virtue ethics is that there are 
 virtues: justice, honesty, compassion, courage, kindness, prudence, 
faith, hope, and love are amongst the most commonly cited virtues. Since 
these are all different virtues, they are associated with different actions. 
For example, honesty is robust truth-telling and, more controversially, 
love is the robust provision of care (Pettit 2015; Ferguson 2018). This 
claim is a claim about the  of virtues. 
Third, although there is a broad consensus that virtues are disposi-
tions and that there are many of them, there is  consensus about how 
(or whether) virtues aggregate. So, there is no common agreement about 
when it is correct to say someone is, on the whole, a virtuous  (apart 
from the trivial claim that virtuous people are those who, broadly speak-
ing, have virtuous characters). This claim is a (negative) claim about how 
the  of specific virtues leads to an all-things-considered virtu-
ous character. 
I mention these three facts about virtue ethics because I think that 
despite their claim to directly engage with virtue-based critiques of mar-
kets, Storr and Choi have, by and large, provided an  response to 
the VC that ultimately requires rejecting some standard accounts of vir-
tue. And my reasons for thinking that this is the case are related to each 
of these three facts about virtues. The first, and most minor, concern I 
have relates to the last point I made about aggregation. 
Claims VC1–VC3, and Storr and Choi’s counterclaims, are aggregate 
claims, all-things-considered judgements about the quality of an individ-
ual’s (VC3) or society’s (VC1 and VC2) behaviour. If the weights that Storr 
and Choi place on certain virtues differ from those of their critics, then 
they may reach different conclusions. For example, a nonmarket society 
may perform better with respect to kindness, and a market society may 
perform better with respect to prudence. If Storr and Choi think prudence 
 
1 There are, of course, different ways to exhibit a virtue—we can be kind, generous, or 
friendly in a variety of ways. So, strictly speaking, to be virtuous is to perform a certain 
action  robustly (not a specific token action). 
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carries more weight in determining whether an individual or a society is 
all-things-considered virtuous than their critics think, then the two will 
come to different conclusions about which society is more virtuous. Now, 
neither Storr and Choi, nor their critics (as far as I know) endorse weights 
or hierarchies of virtues and so this remains primarily a  con-
cern.  
One response to this potential problem is to appeal to dominance rea-
soning. If a market society outperforms a nonmarket society across  
virtues, then, regardless of how various virtues are weighed, the market 
society must be all-things-considered more virtuous. Storr and Choi could 
argue that this is precisely what they have shown. After all, they show 
that market societies fare better than nonmarket societies across a 
 of indicators that proxy for virtues. They provide empirical com-
parisons of market and nonmarket societies with respect to the following 
virtues and vices: prudence (156), altruism (164), tolerance (172), trust 
(177), materialism (168), and corruption (170) and they cite McCloskey’s 
(2006) argument that in order to function, markets require certain levels 
of courage, justice, temperance, prudence, faith, hope, and love. Of 
course, McCloskey’s arguments don’t address the  challenge 
in VC2, but they do allay fears in VC1 that market participation erodes 
certain virtues. 
However, I do not think proponents of the VC will be convinced by 
this dominance reasoning response. First, they may argue that the virtues 
markets corrupt are not those listed by Storr and Choi, but rather virtues 
like empathy or being other-regarding. Relatedly, they may challenge 
whether the empirical evidence Storr and Choi cite is a good  for the 
virtues in question. This brings me to my second concern. 
 
An example of the worry about proxies is the evidence that Storr and Choi 
provide that individuals in market societies are less likely to be material-
istic. Here they show that “people in market societies are less likely to 
view being rich and successful as being important” (168). Furthermore, 
they argue that attitudes about wealth and success are not explained by 
a positive attitude towards competition since more people in nonmarket 
societies think competition is good. They conclude from these results that 
“the evidence (weakly) suggests that people in market societies are less 
likely to be materialistic than people in nonmarket societies” (169). 
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One factor that may drive this result is the decreasing marginal utility 
of wealth and success. If, as Storr and Choi argue, people in nonmarket 
societies are significantly poorer, less healthy, and less happy than those 
in market societies, they will likely have good reason to care more about 
being wealthy and successful. Importantly, on Aristotle’s account, to be 
virtuous is not to  a particular feeling, it is about “having these feel-
ings at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for 
the right end, and in the right way […] it is a mean between two vices, one 
of excess and one of deficiency” (Aristotle 1999, 1106b21–1107a3, 24–
25). With this in mind, it is not clear that the stronger feeling of desire for 
wealth and success experienced by those in nonmarket societies is a vice. 
More fundamentally, it is not clear that attitudes towards wealth and 
success are even appropriate proxies for materialism. Materialism is de-
fined as “a tendency to consider material possessions and physical com-
fort as more important than spiritual values” (Stevenson 2010). Wealth 
and success can be variously interpreted, and variously employed. The 
most charitable interpretation of what animates proponents of the VC is 
that people in market societies pursue the wrong  of wealth and suc-
cess, rather than focusing on values of the kind that Mill ([1863] 2001) 
would have called the ‘higher pleasures’. Arguably, the pursuit of goods, 
such as consumer electronics, or fast fashion is more problematic than 
the pursuit of safe and comfortable housing, or flavourful and nutritious 
foods. In other words, the VC is concerned with the  of ends that 
people in markets pursue. It seems that a more appropriate proxy for the 
vice that proponents of the VC have in mind would be a per capita meas-
ure of advertising expenditures, where market societies will arguably out-
perform nonmarket societies and thus would rank as more materialistic.  
Markets are, on Storr and Choi’s definition, “space[s] where the buying 
and selling of goods and services takes place” and in which people both 
“compete with one another to secure the goods and services that they 
desire” and “cooperate with one another to produce and purchase goods 
and services” (8). As such, markets do not themselves place any con-
straints on the goods that people trade in them. This fact gives rise to the 
concern that markets can become noxious when they include certain 
things that ought not to be for sale (Satz 2010; Sandel 2012). But the ma-
terialism concern is importantly different from the problem of noxious 
markets, for it does not claim that certain goods should not be for sale. 
Rather, the core of the concern about materialism is that the market’s 
agnosticism allows (and encourages, via advertising) individuals to 
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 pursue the wrong kinds of goods. At root, the problem 
is that markets require only a commitment to the relatively thin theory of 
good known as  (Mill [1863] 2001; Steiner 1984, 1994; 
Nozick 1974), which, as Hillel Steiner puts it, “eschew[s] any conception 
of objective value or human needs, [is] agnostic as between different 
tastes and preferences, […] [and] commits itself only to the primacy of 
personal rights and liberties and to individual choice” (1984, 225). Yet, on 
the most charitable reading, the VC proponents’ concerns about materi-
alism are motivated by , which is a theory of the good that 
specifies particular  values (Aristotle 1999; Hurka 1993). 
One response to this challenge is to argue that properly specified, lib-
eralism is a more plausible theory of value than perfectionism. After all, 
it imposes few substantive constraints on the ends that individuals may 
pursue, and thus allows for a high degree of individual liberty. Further-
more, this agnosticism about value allows for a high degree of ecumen-
ism, which allows liberal market societies to be more cosmopolitan in 
practice.  
However, this response is at odds with Storr and Choi’s argument. 
What they want to show is that those values that proponents of the VC 
are concerned with are actually  instantiated in market societies, 
and, consequently, if you are moved by the moral considerations that mo-
tivate the VC, then you actually have moral reasons to support markets. 
The response I have sketched above, however, requires a substantive cri-
tique of the perfectionist considerations that motivate materialist objec-
tions to market societies. 
 
Finally, my third concern relates to the first fact I mentioned: that struc-
turally speaking, virtues are dispositions; robust patterns of behaviour. 
As Pettit puts it, “You will not count as treating me with honesty […] just 
because you tell me the truth under a suitable trigger here and now. After 
all, you might be happy to do that just because it suits your current pur-
poses for me to know how you take things to be”; rather, to say you have 
the virtue of honesty means “your telling me the truth must not be de-
pendent on that sort of contingency. It must be the case that you would 
tell me the truth, for example, even if it was inconvenient for you to do 
so: even if it thwarted rather than furthered your personal ends” (Pettit 
2015, 46). Virtue requires more than the performance of an action in the 
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actual world, it requires that one would also perform the action if things 
happened to be different, that is, across a  of counterfactual worlds. 
An important question is: what is the range of these worlds? It is not 
infinite, for as Pettit also points out, “I could hardly regard you as dishon-
est […] when you [actually] tell me the truth about someone’s wherea-
bouts, on the ground that you would not tell me the truth in a variant on 
actual circumstances in which I want to kill that person, innocent though 
the person is” (Pettit 2015, 49). So, virtue must be robust to certain 
changes in actual circumstance, but not to others. Now, specifying the 
range of virtue’s demands is a complicated issue that requires more space 
than I have available here. What I do want to argue, however, is that many 
virtues require that actions are robust across changes in circumstance 
such as profitability. Yet, since markets incentivise responsiveness to 
profitability considerations, they are, in many cases, incompatible with 
virtuous behaviour, given the dispositional structure of virtues.  
Consider two Aristotelian virtues that Terence Irwin translates as ‘in-
dividual virtues of character’: generosity, and friendliness (Aristotle 
1999). Suppose that in the actual world person  performs a friendly act 
for  but that  wouldn’t act in this way if it became unprofitable for him 
to do so. Surely, though  acts  he is ’s friend, he is not truly a friend 
(fair weather friends, as the saying goes, are no friends at all). Friendship 
requires you to treat your friends in friendly ways “not just as a contin-
gent matter: not just as luck or chance or a spasm of good will would have 
it” (Pettit 2015, 2). Similarly, actual charitable donations do not signify 
the virtue of charity if they are contingent on, for example, the availability 
of tax deductions. These considerations generalise to many of the virtues 
that Storr and Choi consider: altruism, trust, corruption, and tolerance.  
Storr and Choi do include the following caveat: “While we would want 
to assess the reasons why individuals act or feel the way that they do, we 
do not have direct access to people’s motivations” and they point out that 
“being virtuous and behaving virtuously are not disconnected” (250). Yet, 
we do not need  access to agents’ internal states to assess the ro-
bustness of their behaviour. Both natural and lab-based experiments can 
examine how and whether variations in incentive structures can lead 
agents to modify their behaviour. More importantly though, I think Storr 
and Choi have a substantive disagreement with standard virtue ethical 
assumptions about the scope of robustness. In their comments on entre-
preneurialism and the discussion of the virtue of prudence, they suggest 
that sensitivity to the profit motive is morally commendable: 
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Prudent entrepreneurs, for instance, will notice and exploit opportu-
nities to earn a profit by buying a good at a lower price and selling 
that good at a higher price. That the same good is selling at different 
prices is an error in need of correction; the price discrepancy means 
that some producer is selling her wares for too low a price and some 
consumer is buying the goods he wants at too high a price. Prudent 
entrepreneurs will be alert to the existence of these errors and will 
exploit these arbitrage opportunities because of their desire for prof-
its. (155)  
 
Here they are at odds with not only those who advance the VC, but also 
deontological ethicists, such as Kant, who famously argued that while 
charging a fair price is  one’s duty (that is, behaving virtu-
ously), “this is not nearly enough for making us believe that the merchant 
has acted this way  duty and from principles of honesty; his own 
advantage required him to do it […] the action was done neither from 
duty nor from immediate inclination, but merely for a selfish purpose” 
(Kant [1785] 1993, 10; emphasis added). 
To be clear, I am  claiming that Storr and Choi’s position about 
robustness is incorrect or indefensible. Market signals like prices and 
profitability can be important for generating good outcomes. For exam-
ple, suppose merchants raise their prices on the anticipation of a hurri-
cane. Though sometimes described as price gouging, this behaviour can 
lead to better outcomes than if they hadn’t increased prices. First, it in-
centivises more traders to enter the market, supplying more goods at a 
crucial time. Second, higher prices mean that consumers will need to 
think more carefully about whether they really need the goods in ques-
tion. So, without formally restricting individual choices, these price in-
creases nevertheless lead to an outcome where more goods are available 
and where these goods are directed to those who need them most. Sure, 
the  scenario might be one in which individuals enter the market 
without a profit incentive and where individuals voluntarily refrain from 
frivolous purchases in disasters, but unfortunately human behaviour is 
far from perfect. Price increases offer a  solution to the prob-
lem, which, given the feasibility constraints that flawed human behaviour 
imposes, ends up generating the best outcome. 
Thus, there are very good reasons for thinking that agents’ behaviour 
 be responsive to profit motives. Storr and Choi think that respon-
siveness to the profit motive is commendable; proponents of the VC will 
argue that in many cases it signals that an action is not, in fact, virtuous, 
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at least if agents would change their behaviour when the profit motive 
changes. Thus, it is not the case that those who are moved by the VC are 
mistaken in their opposition to markets because the values that they care 
about are actually better instantiated in market societies. Rather, there is 
a real and deep disagreement between VC proponents and Storr and Choi 
about what is of most ethical importance: individual motives and the ro-
bustness of these motives, or the social outcomes that markets facilitate. 
To recap then, I have raised three concerns with Storr and Choi’s re-
sponse to the VC. I think that they have not clearly explained which vir-
tues are most important in determining whether a person is all-things-
considered virtuous and thus there is room for disagreement between VC 
proponents and Storr and Choi about the weights attached to various vir-
tues. I have argued that their interpretation of the content of the virtue 
of materialism differs from the kinds of concerns that VC proponents 
have about materialism in markets. And, finally, I have argued that Storr 
and Choi break with standard accounts of the robustness of virtues by 
allowing agents to change their behaviour based on the profit motive. 
 
 
Early in their book, Storr and Choi acknowledge that 
 
the most damning critiques [of markets] […] are deontological claims 
that do not allow for the possibility that market exchange can be 
moral, what we are calling the common central concern of the moral 
critics of markets […] is at root an empirical, rather than a philosoph-
ical, claim. As such, we can evaluate whether or not it is true that mar-
kets are likely to be morally corrupting using our theoretical under-
standing of how markets can and should work. (12)  
 
But the problem is that the target phenomenon that they seek to empiri-
cally assess is defined  by different ethical theories. Deontolo-
gists, like Kant, are sensitive to the motives on which agents act. Since 
virtues are dispositions, virtue ethicists are sensitive to something simi-
lar: the robustness of actions.2 And the problem for Storr and Choi is that 
the most plausible accounts of both the content and structure of virtues 
suggests that in many cases markets do crowd out virtuous behaviour.  
Although Storr and Choi explicitly argue that markets promote both 
individual and social , the  thrust of their arguments is 
 
2 Though similar, robustness and motives are distinct. See Ferguson (2018) for a discus-
sion. 
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consequentialist in nature. In chapter 4 they provide extensive evidence 
that people “in market societies are wealthier, healthier, happier, and bet-
ter connected than people who live in nonmarket societies” and that these 
benefits accrue to the poor and rich alike (13). They then claim that “this 
material fact […] is of moral significance” (13). And while they are correct 
that it  of moral significance, they are reporting on the good 
 of markets. Similarly, the virtuous  that they focus on—
and support with empirical studies—in chapters 5 and 6 is also a 
. It seems to me that the arguments they really want to make are 
consequentialist in nature. 
 
SC1 Morally good consequences are more prevalent in market societies 
than in nonmarket societies.  
 
SC2 As a society becomes more market-oriented and as the scope of the 
market in a society expands, morally good consequences increase.  
 
SC3 The more a person engages in market activity, the more likely they 
are to enjoy morally good consequences.  
 
SC4 These consequences are, ultimately, morally more important than 
considerations like robustness or motives.  
 
And apart from my quibble over their interpretation of materialism, I 
think Storr and Choi have provided pretty convincing evidence for the 
truth of these first three claims. But the reason that they do not directly 
respond to those motivated by the VC is that they offer no defence of 
their implicit, but substantial, assumption SC4. I think there  good rea-
sons to think that SC4 is true, at least in most ordinary cases, and so there 
is good reason to resist VC at this deep ethical level. But contrary to Storr 
and Choi’s caveats, the debate about this crucial claim, and by extension, 
an adequate response to the VC  the defence of a normative 
ethical claim that cannot be settled by appeals to empirical evidence.  
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